"Pursue on great, decisive, aim with force and determination" Carl von Clausewitz, västvärldens störste militäre tänkare. 1780-1831. Författare bl a till "Om kriget", standardverk vid alla militära akademier.
With the commencement of hostilities on 30 November 1939, Soviet 9th Army Commander Tjujkov committed his two lead divisions, the 163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions, to a two-pronged attack aimed at the road junction of Suomussalmi.The 163rd, under Division Commander Selendsov, was committed first as the 9th Army main effort, attacking to seize the Suomussalmi road junktion to allow the 9th Army to attack both Peranka and Hyrynsalmi. The 163rd Division supporting effort, the 759th Rifle Regiment and the 163rd Recon Battalion, advanced up the Raate road from the south, while the main effort, comprising the remainder of the Division took the northern Juntusranta-Palovaara road.
Tjujkov's intent was for the 163rd to push the northern Finn defenders past Suomussalmi, south out of his zone of operations. The 9th Army supporting effort, the 44thRifle division (following the 759th Rifle Regiment by about 48 hours) would squeeze the retreating Finns from the south. Eventually the Finns would be pushed out onto the ice-covered lakes and eliminated.With Finn resistance crushed , the 9th Army would then be free to advance via Hyrynsalmi and Puolanka to Oulu (Uleåborg), cutting Finland in half and severing the main rail connection to Sweden. Selendsov's higher commander's guidance included instructions to avoid occupying Suomussalmi itself, because of the potential for any unit doing so to be trapped between the lakes on either side of the town.The Finns did not expect an attack in the vicinity of Juntusranta. The roads in this area were so spectacularly bad that they hadn't even been considered as an avenue of advance and so the Finns had shifted the covering force of two battalions of Civic Guards under major Kari south towards Raate. When Selendsov crossed the border with the 662nd and 81st Rifle Regiment and the 163rd division troops, the Finns were able to offer only token resistance from the sole remaining 50-man border police company under command of Lt Elo. Nevertheless, the Soviets found it extremely slow going. Lead elements only reached Palovaara late on the 5. of December.At Palovaara, Seledsov ordered the 662nd Regiment minus one battalion (division reserve), to move north to seize Peranka by nightfall on the 6. of December, to protect the Division northern flank. The 81st continued south to the town, with the remainder of the 163rd, to link up with the 759th Regiment advancing on Suomussalmi from the south. It was at this time that MG Tuomp, commanding the Finn Northern Group of Forces (P-SRE), decided that this was the Soviet main effort in this area, and dispatched his reserve, the 16th Separate Infantry Battalion (ErP16) under Mj Pallari, from Kuusamo via Peranka to reinforce Mj Kari's two Civic Guard battalions which had already moved back to this area.This force arrived in the vicinity of Lake Piipasjärvi at approximately 01:00 on the 6. of December and, by noon, occupied defencive positions to block the Kuusamo road to deny further movement north by the 163rd. Making [fighting] contact here late on the 6. of December, the 662nd stopped and began to probe.Early on the 7 December, the Finns evacuated and burned the town of Suomussalmi. The demolition was incomplete, however, and a substantial number of buildings remained intact. Lead elements of the 81st Rifle Regiment and the 163rd Division Troops arrived later that day, joined by the end of the day by the 759th Regiment and the 163rd Recon Battalion from the Raate road to the south. Pausing, Seledsov issued orders for the 759th Regiment to attack and to seize Puolanka via Hyrynsalmi, and for the 662nd to attack to seize Puolanka via Peranka to allow the division to continue its movement west. the 662nd started first. Facerd with the bitter cold and a shortage of tents, meanwhile, Selendsov was unable to resist the temptation to occupy the town and the surrounding areas from Kylänmäki to the lake Kuomasjärvi. The 662nd Regiment, however, was unable to make any headway against ErP16 toward Peranka.On 8 December Maj Pallari of ErP16 was wounded, and was replaced by LtC Susitaival, on leave from his duties as a member of the Finnish Parliament. With LtC Susitaival given command of all units north and east of Palovaara the command of ErP16 devolved on Cpt Salske.
To be continued....
Ω
tisdag 11 oktober 2016
måndag 10 oktober 2016
4. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi, del IV
Part IV
The two Soviet divisions in this battle arrived at, or near, 100% strength. The 44. Rifle Division, in particular, was considered a crack unit, composed of Ukrainians, and based in the Military District of Moscow. The 163rd Rifle Division was not so well regarded, composed primarily of Central Asians who were completely out of their environment in the far north. The 44th had been issued ski manuals, but no skis, immediately prior to their departure for Soviet Karelia. A ski regiment attached to the 44th was never employed as such. Soviet tanks and other vehicles were painted olive drab, and their uniforms, while generally warm enough, were khaki. The Soviets did not begin to camouflage their uniforms and equipment until January 1940. Soviet petroleum based lubricants froze in the bitter cold, and their vehicle engines had to be run every two hours or their batteries would die. (The Finns used glycerin and antifreeze as a lubricant and were not dependent on vehicles for movement.) The Soviets brought their entire complement of antitank guns, their flat trajectories useless in the forest and in the complete absence of any Finn tanks.
Soviet training had focused on large unit combined arms warfare in open terrain. Their command structure was rigid and prescriptive, primarily a result of the political climate in the Red Army of the late 1930s. Many of their best and brightest officers had been purged in 1937-1938; those who remained were groveling "yes-men" to their "Politruk" commissars or were timid non-entities. Soviet tactical intelligence, in the absence of effective patrolling or sympathetic locals, was non-existent, and their strategic intelligence (including maps) was frequently just plain wrong. In one case, however, they were accurate: in 1937 a Red Army pamphlet on the Finn Army noted that all Finn troops were experienced skiers trained for combat in cold weather, and that their exercise focused on active defense in the difficult Finn terrain. Soviet commanders seem not to have paid much attention to this warning.
The Finns suffered from grave material deficiencies, primarily a result of pre-war political decisions based on economy and an assumption of the inviolability of neutrality. When Col Hjalmar Siilasvuo led his 27th Infantry Regiment into battle near Suomussalmi he had no weapon heavier than .50 cal Maxim machine-guns. The only antitank weapons were grenades, satchel charges, crowbars, and "Molotov Cocktails", witch got their name when the Finn State Liquor Board started manufacturing and distributing empty bottles for just this purpose. He had no artillery, and was even short of some individual equipment, such as load-bearing equipment and uniforms. Most units lacked radios below regimental level and field-telephones were a battalion-level asset. This was fairly typical of the entire Finn Army. Most of their artillery, of pre-WW I vintage, lacked sufficient ammunition. They did, however, have tents and lightweight, portable, wood-fired heaters. These were carried, along with other heavi gear and supplies, in sleds pulled by skiers, called akhios. These preparation for extended cold weather operations was to become a key advantage as the battle progressed.
Finn individual weapons, however, were generally quite good. Both sides used variants of the reliable and effective 7.92 mm M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, but the Finns also had a significant number of 7,92 mm Lahti M-26 light machine-guns (comparable to the US BAR, although prone to jam in cold weather as a result of over-fine machining), and the excellent, if expensively mad, Suomi 9 mm M-31 sub machine-gun. This last weapon had actually been considered and rejected by the Soviets prior to the war; they considered it a "police weapon". After the Winter War, they paid it the ultimate compliment of copying it in simplified form as the PPSh-41 of WW II fame. These two rugged automatic weapons, plus an increasing number of captured Soviet weapons as time went by (the Finns particularly liked the excellent and reliable 7.92 mm Degtyarev light machine-gun) gave the Finns a significant advantage in squad to platoon level firepower. (Each Finn division was authorized 250 M-31s.) Finally, and most important, what the Finns lacked in heavy weapons they made up for in independence, initiative, motivation, training and leadership.
The Finn Army had been born in the Finn seizure of independence from a crumbling Tsarist empire in 1917. Earlier, however, over 2000 young Finn nationalists had traveled covertly to Germany where they enlisted to fight, indirectly for Finn independence, becoming the Prussian 27th Royal Jaeger Battalion. The 27th Jaegers had served on the Eastern Front in the massive campaigns of maneuver around Tannenburg and the Silurian Lakes, the victories of witch led to the fall of the Tsarist Monarchy and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
To be continued...
Ω
The two Soviet divisions in this battle arrived at, or near, 100% strength. The 44. Rifle Division, in particular, was considered a crack unit, composed of Ukrainians, and based in the Military District of Moscow. The 163rd Rifle Division was not so well regarded, composed primarily of Central Asians who were completely out of their environment in the far north. The 44th had been issued ski manuals, but no skis, immediately prior to their departure for Soviet Karelia. A ski regiment attached to the 44th was never employed as such. Soviet tanks and other vehicles were painted olive drab, and their uniforms, while generally warm enough, were khaki. The Soviets did not begin to camouflage their uniforms and equipment until January 1940. Soviet petroleum based lubricants froze in the bitter cold, and their vehicle engines had to be run every two hours or their batteries would die. (The Finns used glycerin and antifreeze as a lubricant and were not dependent on vehicles for movement.) The Soviets brought their entire complement of antitank guns, their flat trajectories useless in the forest and in the complete absence of any Finn tanks.
Soviet training had focused on large unit combined arms warfare in open terrain. Their command structure was rigid and prescriptive, primarily a result of the political climate in the Red Army of the late 1930s. Many of their best and brightest officers had been purged in 1937-1938; those who remained were groveling "yes-men" to their "Politruk" commissars or were timid non-entities. Soviet tactical intelligence, in the absence of effective patrolling or sympathetic locals, was non-existent, and their strategic intelligence (including maps) was frequently just plain wrong. In one case, however, they were accurate: in 1937 a Red Army pamphlet on the Finn Army noted that all Finn troops were experienced skiers trained for combat in cold weather, and that their exercise focused on active defense in the difficult Finn terrain. Soviet commanders seem not to have paid much attention to this warning.
The Finns suffered from grave material deficiencies, primarily a result of pre-war political decisions based on economy and an assumption of the inviolability of neutrality. When Col Hjalmar Siilasvuo led his 27th Infantry Regiment into battle near Suomussalmi he had no weapon heavier than .50 cal Maxim machine-guns. The only antitank weapons were grenades, satchel charges, crowbars, and "Molotov Cocktails", witch got their name when the Finn State Liquor Board started manufacturing and distributing empty bottles for just this purpose. He had no artillery, and was even short of some individual equipment, such as load-bearing equipment and uniforms. Most units lacked radios below regimental level and field-telephones were a battalion-level asset. This was fairly typical of the entire Finn Army. Most of their artillery, of pre-WW I vintage, lacked sufficient ammunition. They did, however, have tents and lightweight, portable, wood-fired heaters. These were carried, along with other heavi gear and supplies, in sleds pulled by skiers, called akhios. These preparation for extended cold weather operations was to become a key advantage as the battle progressed.
Finn individual weapons, however, were generally quite good. Both sides used variants of the reliable and effective 7.92 mm M1891/30 Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle, but the Finns also had a significant number of 7,92 mm Lahti M-26 light machine-guns (comparable to the US BAR, although prone to jam in cold weather as a result of over-fine machining), and the excellent, if expensively mad, Suomi 9 mm M-31 sub machine-gun. This last weapon had actually been considered and rejected by the Soviets prior to the war; they considered it a "police weapon". After the Winter War, they paid it the ultimate compliment of copying it in simplified form as the PPSh-41 of WW II fame. These two rugged automatic weapons, plus an increasing number of captured Soviet weapons as time went by (the Finns particularly liked the excellent and reliable 7.92 mm Degtyarev light machine-gun) gave the Finns a significant advantage in squad to platoon level firepower. (Each Finn division was authorized 250 M-31s.) Finally, and most important, what the Finns lacked in heavy weapons they made up for in independence, initiative, motivation, training and leadership.
The Finn Army had been born in the Finn seizure of independence from a crumbling Tsarist empire in 1917. Earlier, however, over 2000 young Finn nationalists had traveled covertly to Germany where they enlisted to fight, indirectly for Finn independence, becoming the Prussian 27th Royal Jaeger Battalion. The 27th Jaegers had served on the Eastern Front in the massive campaigns of maneuver around Tannenburg and the Silurian Lakes, the victories of witch led to the fall of the Tsarist Monarchy and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
To be continued...
Ω
söndag 9 oktober 2016
3. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi, del III
Part III
Nikita Chrustjov (at that time politic officer (commisar) in the Red Army) writes in his memoars: "We tried to put our own troops on ski, to, but it wasn't easy for ordinary, untrained Red Army soldiers to fight on skies. We started intensively to recruit professional sportsmen. There aren't many around. We had to bring them from Moscow and the Ukraine as well as Leningrad. We gave them a splendid send off... Poor fellows, they were ripped to shreds. I don't know how many came back alive."
Central Finland, in the vicinity of Suomussalmi, is characterized by vast, dense deciduous and coniferous forests, the land carved by recent glacial activity into a patchwork of snow-melt filled swamps, bogs, ponds and lakes. Low ridges and long, narrow valleys stretch generally northeast to southwest. The Soviet intent to cut Finland in half in this area might have seemed simple and inviting on a map in Leningrad, but reality was not so accommodating. While Oulu (Uleåborg) was a critical point and a reasonable selection as an objective, the problem lay in getting there. To cross the grain of the dominant terrain through vast, virgin forests in the dead of winter on roads witch were little more than logging and farm trails seemed to the Finns to be so ill-advised that the Soviet attack there came as a complete surprise.
The surprise was the only thing the Soviets would have in their favor. In this environment (it was the coldest winter seen i Europe since the beginning of record keeping in 1828 - temperatures of minus 30 degrees F (-34 degrees Celsius) were common) and in the face of vicious and persistent harassment by Finns who skied over 20 feet (6 meter) snow drifts with ease in their white camouflage snowsuits (fighting in many cases in their own backyards), the Soviets were singularly ill-prepared. The hapless Ukrainian, Russian and Central Asian conscripts faced what they came to call "Belaya Smjert" (the White Death) witch could come peacefully, when an entire patrol simply vanished in the frigid, silent, forest, or violently, in the form of a bullet in the head from an invisible Finn sniper hundreds of yards away. The night, when it came, seemed long when compared to the nights the southern Soviet conscripts knew, with the sun setting at 14:30 and not raising until 09:30.
The whole region was an obstacle to mechanized units. Cross-country mobility was hampered by the dense forests and swamps; the Soviets were reduced to operating in long regimental, or even division-sized columns, with little or no flank security. Patrols, when sent, floundered ineffectually in the deep snow and forests, or they simply vanished without a trace. Avenues of approach were the Juntusranta-Kiannanniemi road, running E-W in the north; the Raate-Suomussalmi road E-W in the south, and the Suomussalmi- Palovaara road running N-S between the two. This is where the bulk of the fighting occured. Frozen lakes and bogs offered inviting opportunities for movment, but only served the Finns as such. [...] Roads were generally poor, even the Juntusranta-Raate road was only a two-lane gravel track. The Finns compensated by constructing "ice roads" parallel to the main roads, but Soviet attempts at the same were interdicted by aggressive Finn patrolling and ambushes. Key terrain was the mobility corridors and road junctions; the Soviet needed to move to attain their operational objectives, the Finns had to deny that movement. Ultemately, Soviet success dependen on seizure of the Hyrnsalmi and Puolanka road junctions for access to the Finn interior. The Finns, freed from a dependence on terrain by superior mobility, ignored the roads wich were so necessary to Soviet succsess and focused on the enemy force and its ability to fight. Obervation was frequently to only a few hudred yards or simply the next bend of the road. Cover and concealment favored the defender; if the defenders fought from the forests. If anchored to the roads, snaking trough the low areas and shallow ravines as were for the Soviet formations, an attacker would have an easy time creeping up on an unsuspecting road-bound unit with a field of fire perhaps 200 yards (knappt 200 meter) across, at best.
To be continued...
Ω
Nikita Chrustjov (at that time politic officer (commisar) in the Red Army) writes in his memoars: "We tried to put our own troops on ski, to, but it wasn't easy for ordinary, untrained Red Army soldiers to fight on skies. We started intensively to recruit professional sportsmen. There aren't many around. We had to bring them from Moscow and the Ukraine as well as Leningrad. We gave them a splendid send off... Poor fellows, they were ripped to shreds. I don't know how many came back alive."
Central Finland, in the vicinity of Suomussalmi, is characterized by vast, dense deciduous and coniferous forests, the land carved by recent glacial activity into a patchwork of snow-melt filled swamps, bogs, ponds and lakes. Low ridges and long, narrow valleys stretch generally northeast to southwest. The Soviet intent to cut Finland in half in this area might have seemed simple and inviting on a map in Leningrad, but reality was not so accommodating. While Oulu (Uleåborg) was a critical point and a reasonable selection as an objective, the problem lay in getting there. To cross the grain of the dominant terrain through vast, virgin forests in the dead of winter on roads witch were little more than logging and farm trails seemed to the Finns to be so ill-advised that the Soviet attack there came as a complete surprise.
The surprise was the only thing the Soviets would have in their favor. In this environment (it was the coldest winter seen i Europe since the beginning of record keeping in 1828 - temperatures of minus 30 degrees F (-34 degrees Celsius) were common) and in the face of vicious and persistent harassment by Finns who skied over 20 feet (6 meter) snow drifts with ease in their white camouflage snowsuits (fighting in many cases in their own backyards), the Soviets were singularly ill-prepared. The hapless Ukrainian, Russian and Central Asian conscripts faced what they came to call "Belaya Smjert" (the White Death) witch could come peacefully, when an entire patrol simply vanished in the frigid, silent, forest, or violently, in the form of a bullet in the head from an invisible Finn sniper hundreds of yards away. The night, when it came, seemed long when compared to the nights the southern Soviet conscripts knew, with the sun setting at 14:30 and not raising until 09:30.
The whole region was an obstacle to mechanized units. Cross-country mobility was hampered by the dense forests and swamps; the Soviets were reduced to operating in long regimental, or even division-sized columns, with little or no flank security. Patrols, when sent, floundered ineffectually in the deep snow and forests, or they simply vanished without a trace. Avenues of approach were the Juntusranta-Kiannanniemi road, running E-W in the north; the Raate-Suomussalmi road E-W in the south, and the Suomussalmi- Palovaara road running N-S between the two. This is where the bulk of the fighting occured. Frozen lakes and bogs offered inviting opportunities for movment, but only served the Finns as such. [...] Roads were generally poor, even the Juntusranta-Raate road was only a two-lane gravel track. The Finns compensated by constructing "ice roads" parallel to the main roads, but Soviet attempts at the same were interdicted by aggressive Finn patrolling and ambushes. Key terrain was the mobility corridors and road junctions; the Soviet needed to move to attain their operational objectives, the Finns had to deny that movement. Ultemately, Soviet success dependen on seizure of the Hyrnsalmi and Puolanka road junctions for access to the Finn interior. The Finns, freed from a dependence on terrain by superior mobility, ignored the roads wich were so necessary to Soviet succsess and focused on the enemy force and its ability to fight. Obervation was frequently to only a few hudred yards or simply the next bend of the road. Cover and concealment favored the defender; if the defenders fought from the forests. If anchored to the roads, snaking trough the low areas and shallow ravines as were for the Soviet formations, an attacker would have an easy time creeping up on an unsuspecting road-bound unit with a field of fire perhaps 200 yards (knappt 200 meter) across, at best.
To be continued...
Ω
2. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi del II
Part II
On 5 October 1939, Soviet foreign minister Molotov began a series of diplomatic discussions with the Finn Foreign Ministry over what the Soviets termed "concrete political questions". Their demands were simple and even, to them, generous. In short, they cession of most of the Finn islands in the Gulf of Finland, rights to fortify the rest, cession of 40 miles (64 km) of the Karelian isthmus, destruction of all Finn frontier fortifications, a non-aggression pact, and an agreement by Finland not to enter into any diplomatic agreements without Soviet approval. In return they offered territory in Soviet Karelia nearly twice as large as the area to be ceded by Finland. However, Soviet demands touched on the most prosperous and populous area of Finland. Additionally, Finn suspicions of Soviet intent (the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been "neutralized" in September (1939) under similar pretexts) precludes any agreement witch involved the loss of frontier security. The Finns, cautious as always, began mobilization of their largely reservist army on the 10 of October 1939.
At about the same time, the Soviets began a partial mobilization, but did not anticipate inevitable hostilities. As Nikita Chrusjtjov (at that time political officer in the Red Army) reminisced on meetings with Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, "All we had to do was raise our voices a little bit, and the Finns would obey. If that didn't work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender. Or so we thought." In preparation for the expected easy victory, an old Finn bolshevik from the (civil) war of 1918, Otto Ville Kuusinen was detailed from the Comintern to head up a "Karelian SSR". Later, following hostilities, this role was expanded to "Leader of Peoples Democratic Republic of Finland", reflecting the optimistic Soviet anticipation of total victory and the communization of all Finland. Soviet optimism was further reflected in their military preparations; Commissar for Defence, marshal Voroshilov, planned to use only the staff and troops of the Leningrad Military District, augmented with som units drawn from other areas. He expected a two month campaign. Marshal Kulik, Deputy Commissar for Defence, instructed Chief Marshal of Artillery Voronov to plan his ammunition consumption estimated on a twelve-day campaign. The more pessimistic analysts, including Leningrad Military District Commander Meretskov and Chief of the General Staff Army Commander Shaposhnikov, cautioned against expected Finn resistance, but were unable to prevail against Stalin's political assumptions.
The Soviets mustered a huge force, considering the expected weakness of their opposition. A nation of 171 million fielded 600'000 soldiers organized in four armies, comprising 28 Rifle Divisions, one Mechanized Corps, and five Tank Brigades against a nation of 3,5 million fielding an reservist army of three corps, comprising eight infantry divisions, plus an assortment of Boarder Guards, and Civic Guards. Total Finn troops strength was around 300'000 after mobilization, including the Civic Guard and the Women's Auxiliary (Lotta Svärd) The Finns had 28 old WW I vintage Renault FT-17 tanks, 10 Vickers-Armstrong light tanks. and their artillery: 24 field guns and 12 howitzers per division - most of them of origin of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Ammunition was critically low.. Some units were even depending on 107 mm guns m/87... constructed before the invention of counter-recoil mechanisms.
The Soviets deployed their forces along the entire Russo-Finn border with the bulk of their forces concentrated opposite the Mannerheim Line, a string of Finn obstacle, bunker, and trench system fortifications stretching for about 90 miles (145 km) across the Karelian isthmus. While frequently portrayed as heavily defended, the Mannerheim Line was actually nothing more than a series of outposts and occational log-bunker/trench system strongpoints without any fortifications i depth.The rest of the Finn border had no fortifications at all. The Soviet plan, as devised by Meretskov, was simple. By pressing the Finn defenses as hard as possible along the entire length of the border, the Finns would be forced to commit their entire force, including any scant reserves, to a desperate attempt to prevent penetration of their borders and the piecemeal division of theit homeland. Meanwhile, the Mannerheim Line would be crushed between the anvil of the Soviet 7th Army, attacking frontally, and the hammer of the Soviet 8th Army which would penetrate Finn defences north of Lake Ladoga to swing south and catch the defenders from behind, enabling the 7th Army to advance into the interior of Finnish Karelia, the economic, political and demographic heart of Finland. The 9th Army under Army Commander Tjujkov, comprising a Special Corps (122nd Rifle Division) the main effort 45th Corps (163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions), Group Rebola (54th Rifle Division) and a reserve (88th Rifle Division), would attack west toward Oulu to cut Finland in half and deny western support from reaching Finn forces. The Soviet 14th Army and Group Murmansk would occupy the arctic port of Petsamo and northen Finland (Lapland) to secure the northern flank.
The Finns faced this threat with a sense of optimism. While the USSR was their only likely opponent, and the Finns had no real hope of prevailing, most anticipated foreign assistance. Accordingly their plan was simple - hold out for as long as possible and rely on the collective Western European conscience. Unfortunately, in the winter of 1939-1940, most of Europe was otherwise involved. The US had retreated behind a curtain of isolationist rhetoric, buttressed by anti-intervention laws passed in the wake the Spanish Civil War. Finland faced the Red Army onslaught on its own; the only help forthcoming was to be too little, too late.
To be continued...
Ω
lördag 8 oktober 2016
1. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi, del I
Plötsligt återfann jag dokumentet jag tidigare förgäves sökt: Michael R Evans avhandling rörande slaget om Suomussalmi den 7 december 1939 - 8 januari 1940, publicerad den 23 maj 1997.
Internetlänken till avhandlingen är bruten.. sedan när? Jag vet inte! Här följer en avskrift på engelska av min pappersdokumentation.
För att göra läsandet hanterbart - och desslikes mitt (av)skrivande - är avhandlingen uppdelad.
Här följer första delen rörande slaget om Suomussalmi. Avhandlingen är skriven på engelska men det bereder knappast läsarna av Tidsspegeln något problem!
LTC Paavo Susitaival
16th Separate Infantry Battalion, ErP16, MAJ I. Pallari, succeeded by LTC Paavo Susitaival, succeeded by CPT Salske
15.th Separate Infantry Battalion, (ErP 15), CPT Matti Harola
6.th Bicycle Battalion, (PPP6), MAJ Järvinen
Two Civic Guard battalions, MAJ Kaarle Kari
1 Border Police company, LT Elo
9TH DIVISION (FORMED ON 21. Dec)
CPT Mäkkinen, G2
CPT Alpo Marttinen, G3
Internetlänken till avhandlingen är bruten.. sedan när? Jag vet inte! Här följer en avskrift på engelska av min pappersdokumentation.
För att göra läsandet hanterbart - och desslikes mitt (av)skrivande - är avhandlingen uppdelad.
Här följer första delen rörande slaget om Suomussalmi. Avhandlingen är skriven på engelska men det bereder knappast läsarna av Tidsspegeln något problem!
Order of battle
Finland
Northen Group of Forces (P-SRE)
MG W.E. Tuompo
22nd Field Replenishment (Replacment Depot) Division (22.KT-D)
TASK FORCE SUSI
LTC Paavo Susitaival
16th Separate Infantry Battalion, ErP16, MAJ I. Pallari, succeeded by LTC Paavo Susitaival, succeeded by CPT Salske
15.th Separate Infantry Battalion, (ErP 15), CPT Matti Harola
6.th Bicycle Battalion, (PPP6), MAJ Järvinen
Two Civic Guard battalions, MAJ Kaarle Kari
1 Border Police company, LT Elo
9TH DIVISION (FORMED ON 21. Dec)
COL Hjalmar Siilasvuo, commanding
CPT Mäkkinen, G2
CPT Alpo Marttinen, G3
27.th Infantry Regiment, (JR27), COL Hjalmar Siilasvuo, succeeded by
COL Johann Makiniemi
1/27, CPT Lassila
2/27, MAJ Sihvonen
3/27, CPT Airimo
64th Infantry Regiment, (JR64), LTC Frans Fagernäs
1/64, CPT Mänkonen
2/64 CPT Räsänen
3/64, CPT Simelius
65th Infantry Regiment, (JR65), LTC Karl Mandelin
1/65 MAJ Hakanen
2/65 CPT Hyppoelä
3/65 CPT Flink
1st Ranger Batallion, (SissiP1), CPT Häkkinen
22nd Reconnaissance Battalion (Kev.Os22), CPT Paavola
22nd Pioneer Batallion (PionP22), LT Sorasalmi
9th Division Artillery, (KTR9), CPT Ahlholm
Elements of 4th Field Artillery Regiment, (KTR4)
4th Replacement Battalion, LT Karhunen
Soviet
9TH ARMY
Army Commander Tjujkov (Chuikov)
45th Corps
Corps Commander Dashitsev
44th Rifle Division
Division Commander Vinogradov
25th Rifle Regiment
305th Rifle Regiment
146th Rifle Regiment
4th Recon Battalion
44th Pioneer Battalion
312th Tank Battalion
58th Antitank Battalion
3rd Ski Regiment
48th Truck Battalion
122nd Artillery Regiment
179th Artillery Regiment
44th Medical Battalion
84 Mobile Field Hospital
Horse Field Clinic
AAA Machine-gun Company
Signal Battalion
Divisional Air Support Unit
Extra Various members of the traitor Kuusinen's "Peoples Democratic Army of Finland"
(Otto Ville Kuusinen was appointed by Stalin as leader of "Peoples Democratic Finland". Dead i Moscov 1964. Burried in the Kremlin Wall.
163rd Rifle Division
Division Commander Selendsov
759th Rifle Regiment
662nd Rifle Regiment
81st Rifle Regiment
1st Battalion/82nd Rifle Rifle Regiment
163rd Recon Battalion
230 Pioneer Battalion
246th Pioneer Battalion
13th Road Construction Battalion
222nd Tank Battalion
203rd Antitank Battalion
304th Antitank Company
148th Truck Battalion
147th Transportation Regiment
86th Artillery Regiment
365th Artillery Regiment
163rd Medical Battalion
225th Field Hospital
175th Hospital
248th Signal Battalion
147th Chemical Company
204 Chemical Battalion
274 Field Bakery
SYNOPSIS
On 30 Nov 1939, the USSR invaded Finland. The Soviet 9th Army attacked to seize the rail center at Oulu to cut Finland in two at the narrow waist and cut off rail communication with Sweden. The two divisions attacked succsessively, first the 163rd along a northwest to southwest axis on the northern flank, and then the 44th along a southeast axis on the southern flank. The inithial task was to seize the road junction of Suomussalmi and to destroy any Finn forces in that area to allow the 9th Army to control the Suomussalmi-Oulu axis of advance. Finn forces rushed to the area quickly buildt up from constant harassment attacks, witch greatly limited Soviet movment, to vicious local road cutting and blocking attacks which createdisolated pockets of Soviet forces (which the Finns termed "mottis", from the the Finn word for a cord of firewood, cut and left in measured piles to be collected later).
The 44th Division stalled on the road six miles (6,7 km) south of Suomussalmi, still in a 20 mile (32 km) long march formation (on the Raate road). They were apposed by a two-company roadblock.
The 163rd Division, meanwhile, was hacked to pieces, ceasing to exist on or about 29 Dec 1939.
The Finns then turned their attention to the 44th Division, which suffered a similar fate, resistance ceasing on the morning of 8 Jan 1940.
This is an example of what a small number of well-trained, well-led, motivated soldiers can do when faced seemingly overwhelming odds in numbers and material. The Soviets, however, learned a number of valuable lessons from this battle and the others like it during this war, and applied these lessons in total, or in pasrt, by the time of the German invasion of the USSR in the spring (should be Midsommer Day, 22. of June!) of 1941.
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To be continued... Ω
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To be continued... Ω
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