2. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi del II

Part II

On 5 October 1939, Soviet foreign minister Molotov began a series of diplomatic discussions with the Finn Foreign Ministry over what the Soviets termed "concrete political questions". Their demands were simple and even, to them, generous. In short, they cession of most of the Finn islands in the Gulf of Finland, rights to fortify the rest, cession of 40 miles (64 km) of the Karelian isthmus, destruction of all Finn frontier fortifications, a non-aggression pact, and an agreement by Finland not to enter into any diplomatic agreements without Soviet approval. In return they offered territory in Soviet Karelia nearly twice as large as the area to be ceded by Finland. However, Soviet demands touched on the most prosperous and populous area of Finland. Additionally, Finn suspicions of Soviet intent (the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been "neutralized" in September (1939) under similar pretexts) precludes any agreement witch involved the loss of frontier security. The Finns, cautious as always, began mobilization of their largely reservist army on the 10 of October 1939.

At about the same time, the Soviets began a partial mobilization, but did not anticipate inevitable hostilities. As Nikita Chrusjtjov (at that time political officer in the Red Army) reminisced on meetings with Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, "All we had to do was raise our voices a little bit, and the Finns would obey. If that didn't work, we could fire one shot and the Finns would put up their hands and surrender. Or so we thought." In preparation for the expected easy victory, an old Finn bolshevik from the (civil) war of 1918, Otto Ville Kuusinen was detailed from the Comintern to head up a "Karelian SSR". Later, following hostilities, this role was expanded to "Leader of Peoples Democratic Republic of Finland", reflecting the optimistic Soviet anticipation of total victory and the communization of all Finland. Soviet optimism was further reflected in their military preparations; Commissar for Defence, marshal Voroshilov, planned to use only the staff and troops of the Leningrad Military District, augmented with som units drawn from other areas. He expected a two month campaign.  Marshal Kulik, Deputy Commissar for Defence, instructed Chief Marshal of Artillery Voronov to plan his ammunition consumption estimated on a twelve-day campaign. The more pessimistic analysts, including Leningrad Military District Commander Meretskov and Chief of the General Staff Army Commander Shaposhnikov, cautioned against expected Finn resistance, but were unable to prevail against Stalin's political assumptions.

The Soviets mustered a huge force, considering the expected weakness of their opposition. A nation of 171 million fielded 600'000 soldiers organized in four armies, comprising 28 Rifle Divisions, one Mechanized Corps, and five Tank Brigades against a nation of 3,5 million fielding an reservist army of three corps, comprising eight infantry divisions, plus an assortment of Boarder Guards, and Civic Guards. Total Finn troops strength was around 300'000 after mobilization, including the Civic Guard and the Women's Auxiliary (Lotta Svärd) The Finns had 28 old WW I vintage Renault FT-17 tanks, 10 Vickers-Armstrong light tanks. and their artillery: 24 field guns and 12 howitzers per division - most of them of origin of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Ammunition was critically low.. Some units were even depending on 107 mm guns m/87... constructed before the invention of counter-recoil mechanisms.

The Soviets deployed their forces along the entire Russo-Finn border with the bulk of their forces concentrated opposite the Mannerheim Line, a string of Finn obstacle, bunker, and trench system fortifications stretching for about 90 miles (145 km) across the Karelian isthmus. While frequently portrayed as heavily defended, the Mannerheim Line was actually nothing more than a series of outposts and occational log-bunker/trench system strongpoints without any fortifications i depth.The rest of the Finn border had no fortifications at all. The Soviet plan, as devised by Meretskov, was simple. By pressing the Finn defenses as hard as possible along the entire length of the border, the Finns would be forced to commit their entire force, including any scant reserves, to a desperate attempt to prevent penetration of their borders and the piecemeal division of theit homeland. Meanwhile, the Mannerheim Line would be crushed between the anvil of the Soviet 7th Army, attacking frontally, and the hammer of the Soviet 8th Army which would penetrate Finn defences north of Lake Ladoga to swing south and catch the defenders from behind, enabling the 7th Army to advance into the interior of Finnish Karelia, the economic, political and demographic heart of Finland. The 9th Army under Army Commander Tjujkov, comprising a Special Corps (122nd Rifle Division) the main effort 45th Corps (163rd and 44th Rifle Divisions), Group Rebola (54th Rifle Division) and a reserve (88th Rifle Division), would attack west toward Oulu to cut Finland in half and deny western support from reaching Finn forces. The Soviet 14th Army and Group Murmansk would occupy the arctic port of Petsamo and northen Finland (Lapland) to secure the northern flank.

The Finns faced this threat with a sense of optimism. While the USSR was their only likely opponent, and the Finns had no real hope of prevailing, most anticipated foreign assistance. Accordingly their plan was simple - hold out for as long as possible and rely on the collective Western European conscience. Unfortunately, in the winter of 1939-1940, most of Europe was otherwise involved. The US had retreated behind a curtain of isolationist rhetoric, buttressed by anti-intervention laws passed in the wake the Spanish Civil War. Finland faced the Red Army onslaught on its own; the only help forthcoming was to be too little, too late.

To be continued...



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