söndag 9 oktober 2016

3. Finska Vinterkriget 1939-1940: Slaget om Suomussalmi, del III

Part III

Nikita Chrustjov (at that time politic officer (commisar) in the Red Army) writes in his memoars: "We tried to put our own troops on ski, to, but it wasn't easy for ordinary, untrained Red Army soldiers to fight on skies. We started intensively to recruit professional sportsmen. There aren't many around. We had to bring them from Moscow and the Ukraine as well as Leningrad. We gave them a splendid send off... Poor fellows, they were ripped to shreds. I don't know how many came back alive."

Central Finland, in the vicinity of Suomussalmi, is characterized by vast, dense deciduous and coniferous forests, the land carved by recent glacial activity into a patchwork of snow-melt filled swamps, bogs, ponds and lakes. Low ridges and long, narrow valleys stretch generally northeast to southwest. The Soviet intent to cut Finland in half in this area might have seemed simple and inviting on a map in Leningrad, but reality was not so accommodating. While Oulu (Uleåborg) was a critical point and a reasonable selection as an objective, the problem lay in getting there. To cross the grain of the dominant terrain through vast, virgin forests in the dead of winter on roads witch were little more than logging and farm trails seemed to the Finns to be so ill-advised that the Soviet attack there came as a complete surprise.

The surprise was the only thing the Soviets would have in their favor. In this environment (it was the coldest winter seen i Europe since the beginning of record keeping in 1828 - temperatures of minus 30 degrees F (-34 degrees Celsius) were common) and in the face of vicious and persistent harassment by Finns who skied over 20 feet (6 meter) snow drifts with ease in their white camouflage snowsuits (fighting in many cases in their own backyards), the Soviets were singularly ill-prepared. The hapless Ukrainian, Russian and Central Asian conscripts faced what they came to call "Belaya Smjert" (the White Death) witch could come peacefully, when an entire patrol simply vanished in the frigid, silent, forest, or violently, in the form of a bullet in the head from an invisible Finn sniper hundreds of yards away. The night, when it came, seemed long when compared to the nights the southern Soviet conscripts knew, with the sun setting at 14:30 and not raising until 09:30.

The whole region was an obstacle to mechanized units. Cross-country mobility was hampered by the dense forests and swamps; the Soviets were reduced to operating in long regimental, or even division-sized columns, with little or no flank security. Patrols, when sent, floundered ineffectually in the deep snow and forests, or they simply vanished without a trace. Avenues of approach were the Juntusranta-Kiannanniemi road, running E-W in the north; the Raate-Suomussalmi road E-W in the south, and the Suomussalmi- Palovaara road running N-S between the two. This is where the bulk of the fighting occured. Frozen lakes and bogs offered inviting opportunities for movment, but only served the Finns as such. [...] Roads were generally poor, even the Juntusranta-Raate road was only a two-lane gravel track.  The Finns compensated by constructing "ice roads" parallel to the main roads, but Soviet attempts at the same were interdicted by aggressive Finn patrolling and ambushes. Key terrain was the mobility corridors and road junctions; the Soviet needed to move to attain their operational objectives, the Finns had to deny that movement. Ultemately, Soviet success dependen on seizure of the Hyrnsalmi and Puolanka road junctions for access to the Finn interior. The Finns, freed from a dependence on terrain by superior mobility, ignored the roads wich were so necessary to Soviet succsess and focused on the enemy force and its ability to fight. Obervation was frequently to only a few hudred yards or simply the next bend of the road. Cover and concealment favored the defender; if the defenders fought from the forests. If anchored to the roads, snaking trough the low areas and shallow ravines as were for the Soviet formations, an attacker would have an easy time creeping up on an unsuspecting road-bound unit with a field of fire perhaps 200 yards (knappt 200 meter) across, at best.

To be continued...

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